Asem Bhakta
Special Correspondent North East
Imphal: (Waari Singbul Networks) The northeastern states of India have long been a complex tapestry of ethnic diversity, historical grievances, and geopolitical significance. Among them, Manipur and Mizoram—two states sharing borders with Myanmar—have recently drawn attention for their roles in the evolving security landscape of the region. While Manipur has been embroiled in ethnic violence since May 2023, grappling with internal strife between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, Mizoram has quietly emerged as a more insidious national security concern.
Manipur: A Visible Crisis Contained Within Borders
Manipur’s challenges are stark and immediate. The ethnic violence that erupted in May 2023 has claimed over 258 lives and displaced more than 60,000 people, according to official figures as of November 2024. The conflict, rooted in tensions over land rights, affirmative action, and illegal immigration from Myanmar, has exposed deep ethnic fault lines between the valley-dwelling Meiteis and the hill-based Kuki-Zo tribes. The state’s proximity to the Golden Triangle—a notorious drug-producing region spanning Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand—has also fueled a narco-economy, with poppy cultivation and drug trafficking exacerbating local instability. The Manipur government’s “War on Drugs” has made strides in curbing this menace, reportedly reducing drug transit through the state to near negligible levels by late 2024, thanks to aggressive enforcement and central government support.
Yet, Manipur’s crisis, while severe, remains largely an internal affair. The violence has not overtly spilled beyond its borders, and the central government’s imposition of President’s Rule in February 2025 reflects a decisive effort to contain and address the situation. The state’s security challenges, tied to ethnic rivalries and narcotics, are being met with a combination of military presence, administrative oversight, and diplomatic measures like border fencing along the Indo-Myanmar frontier. Manipur’s threats, though significant, are visible, localized, and—at least for now—manageable within India’s federal framework.
Mizoram: A Quiet but Growing Menace
In contrast, Mizoram presents a subtler but potentially more dangerous threat to India’s national security. Historically a conduit for cross-border trade and migration due to its 510-kilometer porous border with Myanmar, Mizoram has recently seen a dramatic spike in narcotics and explosives trafficking. The unrest in Manipur since 2023 has diverted drug routes from the Moreh-Sugnu axis in Manipur to the Zokhawthar-Kolasib axis in Mizoram, turning the latter into a preferred transit hub for heroin, methamphetamine, and cannabis originating from Myanmar. Data from 2023 indicates that Mizoram’s security forces seized contraband worth over ₹78 crore in just over a month, a sharp increase attributed to the shifting dynamics of the regional drug trade. Meanwhile, the state’s Governor, in February 2025, highlighted the arrest of 600 drug traffickers and the seizure of 429 kilograms of narcotics in the current financial year alone—a testament to the scale of the problem.
More alarmingly, Mizoram has emerged as a smuggling hub for explosives. In 2024, Assam Rifles intercepted over 2,000 kilograms of explosives, 60,000 detonators, and 13,000 gelatine sticks, with seizures continuing into 2025 at an accelerated pace. These materials, often destined for anti-junta forces in Myanmar or insurgent groups in Bangladesh, underscore Mizoram’s role as a logistical lifeline for regional instability. The porous border, combined with lax oversight of licensed explosives dealers, raises the specter of these weapons being redirected to Indian insurgent groups—a scenario Assam Rifles officers have repeatedly flagged as a “larger danger.”
Zo State Advocacy: A Separatist Undercurrent
Compounding these material threats is Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma’s vocal advocacy for a unified Zo state, an aspiration that transcends India’s national boundaries. The Zo people—encompassing the Mizo, Kuki, Zomi, and Chin communities across India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh—share ethnic and cultural ties that Lalduhoma has leveraged to push a narrative of reunification. In September 2024, speaking to the Kuki-Zo diaspora in the United States, he declared that the Zo people “do not accept boundaries between countries” and envisioned a future where they rise “under one leadership to achieve our destiny of nationhood.” This rhetoric, echoed by his predecessor Zoramthanga during the Manipur crisis, directly challenges India’s territorial integrity and has drawn sharp rebukes from Manipur’s Chief Minister N. Biren Singh, who warned against interference in his state’s affairs.
Lalduhoma’s stance is not mere political posturing. It aligns with a broader, decades-long agenda speculated by some observers to carve out a “Kuki-Chin nation” from contiguous areas of Myanmar, India, and Bangladesh. This vision involves illegal immigration, land acquisition, and the establishment of autonomous zones—steps that could culminate in separatism. Mizoram’s hosting of over 12,500 displaced Kuki-Zo individuals from Manipur and 40,000 refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh further fuels this narrative, creating a demographic and political base for Zo unification efforts.
The Pact of Pro-Democratic Outfits: A Tipping Point?
The recent signing of a pact by pro-democratic outfits in Mizoram, reported in February 27, 2025, marks a critical escalation. While details remain sparse, this agreement—purportedly involving armed rebel groups advocating for democratic reforms and fighting government forces in Myanmar—signals Mizoram’s growing entanglement with anti-junta forces across the border. Such alliances could legitimize Mizoram as a staging ground for transnational militancy, drawing parallels to the state’s historical role during the Mizo insurgency of the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike Manipur, where militant groups like the Kuki National Army operate within a domestic context, Mizoram’s pact risks internationalizing its security challenges, potentially inviting foreign actors—such as China, which views India’s Act East policy with suspicion—into the fray.
Why Mizoram Outweighs Manipur as a Threat
Manipur’s crisis, while devastating, is a fire that burns brightly but within a confined space. Its ethnic violence and narco-issues are being addressed through direct intervention, and its leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to India’s unity. Mizoram, however, is a slow-burning fuse with far-reaching implications. Its transformation into a narcotics and explosives hub not only undermines India’s internal security but also strengthens destabilizing forces in a volatile region. The state’s leadership, by championing Zo reunification, flirts with separatism at a time when India is fortifying its northeastern borders against external threats.
The central government’s reimposition of the Protected Area Regime in December 2024, requiring foreigners to obtain permits to enter Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, is a belated acknowledgment of these risks. Yet, it may not suffice. Mizoram’s trajectory demands a more robust response: stricter border controls, enhanced intelligence operations, and a clear disavowal of separatist rhetoric from its leaders. Failure to act decisively could see Mizoram eclipse Manipur as the epicenter of India’s northeastern security woes, threatening not just the region but the nation as a whole.
In conclusion, while Manipur wrestles with its demons, Mizoram’s quiet metamorphosis into a narcotics-explosives hub and a potential separatist stronghold poses a deeper, more insidious challenge. The stakes are high, and the time to confront this emerging threat is now—before the fuse burns down to its inevitable, explosive.
